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usage decisions. Credit line usage is found to be inversely related to macroeconomic 
conditions. Overall, while several factors influence corporate credit line usage, our analysis 







Keywords: credit lines, firm default, bank lending, exposure at default  
 
JEL codes: E32, G18, M21 
 
Acknowledgements:  The views expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Banco 
de España, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or the Federal Reserve System. We gratefully 
acknowledge the comments of Mark Carey, Ethan Cohen Cole, Adolfo Corrales, Hans Degryse, Kimberly 
DeTrask, Antonella Foglia, Jan-Pieter Krahnen, Andrea Resti, Rafael Repullo, Til Schuermann, Phil Strahan, 
Rob Valletta and seminar participants at the FDIC’s Center for Financial Research Sixth Annual Bank Research 
Conference, the 2006 GRETA C.R.E.D.I.T. conference, Moody’s KMV, the Federal Reserve Banks of New 
York and San Francisco, and the 2007 Applied Banking Workshop of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision.   1
 













Since bank credit lines are a major source of corporate funding and liquidity, we examine the 
determinants of credit line usage with a database of Spanish corporate credit lines. A line’s 
default status is the primary factor driving its usage, which increases as a firm approaches 
default. Several lender characteristics suggest an important role for bank monitoring in firms’ 
usage decisions. Credit line usage is found to be inversely related to macroeconomic 
conditions. Overall, while several factors influence corporate credit line usage, our analysis 
suggests that default and supply-side variables are the most important. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Bank credit lines are a major source of funding and liquidity for corporations as well 
as an important business line for commercial banks. Sufi (2007) found that credit lines 
account for over 80% of the bank financing provided to U.S. public firms, while Kashyap et 
al. (2002) found that 70% of bank lending by U.S. small firms is through credit lines. For 
Spanish firms, the subject of our study, credit lines account for 42% of firms’ bank financing 
and 32% of banks’ total new lending commitments, on average. Given this pervasive use of 
credit lines in practice and the importance assigned to them in theory, such as in Holstrom 
and Tirole (1998), our goal is to examine empirically the primary factors influencing firms’ 
decisions to use their credit lines. 
 
A clearer understanding of corporate credit line usage should provide meaningful 
insights into several inter-related questions regarding corporate finance and credit risk 
management. Sufi (2007) finds that credit lines are an important component of firms’ 
liquidity management decisions and that credit line use is determined by an interaction 
between the firm and its lender primarily through covenants based on performance measures, 
such as profitability. Our empirical results support this finding, as well as the finding by 
Gatev and Strahan (2006) that banks are key liquidity providers for firms. 
 
Our results also highlight the importance of firms’ default risk in determining credit 
line use. In particular, our results indicate that firms heading into default draw on their credit 
lines quite heavily. Hence, understanding the determinants of a lender’s exposure at default 
(commonly know as EAD) through credit lines is an important, but scarcely researched, topic 
in credit risk management.   
 
For our analysis, the variable of interest is the percentage of a firm’s committed credit 
line that was actually drawn down in a given year. Our datasource is the credit register 
maintained by the Banco de España, the Spanish central bank and primary banking 
supervisory agency. Known as the Central de Información de Riesgos (CIR), the dataset 
contains information on any loan commitment above €6,000 granted by any bank operating in 
Spain since 1984. The dataset has three unique features that permit us to examine corporate 
credit line use. First, the dataset contains information on the amounts drawn and available for 
all corporate credit lines. To our knowledge, this set of corporate credit lines is the most   3
comprehensive examined to date. Second, the dataset contains default information specific to 
individual credit lines and across all of the borrowers’ credit commitments.  Hence, we have 
a complete history of firm default behavior. Third, since our sample period spans a complete 
business cycle, we can analyze credit line utilization during expansions and contractions, 
contributing to the literature regarding the role played by economic fluctuations on credit 
constraints and credit risk measures, such as EAD.    
   
  One of our main findings is that credit line usage is very different for firms that 
eventually default and those that do not, even several years in advance of the default year. 
“Default” is defined here to mean that the firm has not met or is judged by its creditors to be 
unable to meet its scheduled payments. Credit lines to non-defaulting firms in our sample 
have a median usage ratio of about 43%. Credit lines to defaulting firms have a median ratio 
of 50% five years prior to default, and it rises to 71% in the default year. We examine this 
difference further within a reduced form model using line-specific, borrower-specific, and 
lender-specific factors as well as general economic conditions. 
 
This finding is an important contribution to the credit risk management literature 
because EAD is a key element of credit loss calculations. While EAD is a random variable 
that represents the sum of a lender’s current exposure to a borrower plus the expected value 
of any additional drawdown on existing credit lines up to the date of possible default, most 
credit risk models currently treat EAD as known.  Even more surprisingly, EAD is assumed 
to be independent of a firm’s default probability (commonly known as PD).  Our analysis 
indicates that PD and EAD are closely related and that this correlation must be accounted for 
to generate accurate credit risk measures, such as value-at-risk.  Similarly, the pricing of the 
options embedded within credit lines to draw down funds is an important risk management 
tool for lenders (i.e. a credit line can be divided into a funded loan and an option to borrow). 
While we do not have access to such prices in our dataset, our empirical results, advancing 
understanding of cross-sectional and systematic determinants of EAD, provide some of the 
necessary foundations for future work on that subject by producing a set of stylized facts 
about what drives drawdown rates. 
 
As suggested by the raw data, firms that default on their credit lines during the sample 
period have significantly higher usage rates, and these rates increase as the default year 
approaches. The quantification of this “default effect” on how firms that eventually default   4
use their credit lines is a new finding in this literature. In addition, the age of the credit line is 
found to contribute to the usage rate. This “aging effect” seems to decrease the usage rate by 
10% per year, although this effect is smaller for defaulted firms. The combination of these 
two effects accounts for much of the differences between usage ratios of defaulted and non-
defaulted firms.   
 
The CIR database has limited information on the borrowing firms beyond their default 
histories. Using this information, we find that borrowers identified ex-ante as riskier due to 
prior defaults use less of their new credit lines. This result is roughly analogous to the finding 
by Sufi (2007) that banks use financial covenants based on profitability to limit credit line use 
when performance declines. To increase the number of the firm-level explanatory variables in 
our study, we merge the CIR database with the Informa database of accounting variables for a 
representative sample of Spanish firms. While the merged sample is smaller than the CIR 
sample, we can examine the impact of more informative firm-specific variables on credit line 
usage. For example, we find that firm asset size and age are negatively correlated with credit 
line usage, which is consistent with our earlier default variable; that is, younger and smaller 
firms have higher default rates in the CIR database.  Firm profitability, as measured by return 
on assets (ROA), is also negatively correlated with credit line usage, a result consistent with 
Sufi (2007). However, for our study, firm-specific variables have a relatively small economic 
impact; for example, a one percentage point increase in ROA leads only to a 0.4 percentage 
point decline in the usage ratio. Our results suggest that firm performance is not a primary 
driver of credit line use by Spanish firms. 
 
Since the CIR database contains detailed information on the bank lenders, we examine 
several questions relating to funding supply issues using lender-specific variables. We find 
that a firm’s banking relationships affect their credit line usage in several ways. As the length 
of a banking relationship increases, usage rates decrease, which suggests that older firms 
draw down less on their credit lines. The findings that firms actually draw less on the credit 
lines managed by their main banks (i.e., the banks with which a firm does the bulk of its 
borrowing) and that the duration of the bank-borrower relationship affects negatively the 
usage rate are both consistent with the classic “hold up” argument that banks limit funding to 
their most dependent borrowers. We find that credit line usage decreases with a firm’s 
number of banking relationships, suggesting, as in Farinha and Santos (2002), that less 
creditworthy firms and those with bad past performance are more likely to establish multiple   5
banking relationships in order to obtain more funds when their main banks deny their 
requests.  
 
As noted in both, banking and macroeconomic literatures, the state of the business 
cycle has a definite effect on firm balance sheets, default probabilities and credit line usage 
(see, for example, Morgan, 1998). In our analysis, we find that Spanish GDP growth is 
inversely correlated with credit line usage; increases in GDP growth are associated with a 
modest, but statistical significant, decline in credit line usage. Additionally, there is an 
asymmetric nature to this relationship such that a decline in GDP growth leads to a larger 
increase in credit line usage. This result suggests that credit lines could be a liquidity 
insurance mechanism for firms, as discussed by Gatev and Strahan (2006) as well as Sufi 
(2007). However, we do not have information on the interest rate and fees charged on these 
credit line needed to examine this finding further. 
 
In summary, our study uses the Spanish credit register to examine the determining 
factors driving corporate credit line usage. Our empirical results suggest that a wide variety 
of loan-level, firm-level, lender-level and macroeconomic factors impact these activities.   
However, the most important factors seem to be a firm’s default experience, the lifespan of 
the credit facility, and certain lender characteristics, such as the length of the banking 
relationship. While firm-level performance variables are significant in our regressions, their 
marginal impact is much smaller than these other variables. Our results suggest that short of 
firm default, credit line usage by Spanish firms is primarily driven by banking relationships 
and less by firm performance. Finally, the finding that the exposure at default in a credit line 
is closely related to the probability of default of that line has important implications for credit 
risk management and modeling techniques, such as value-at-risk measures and the option 
pricing of credit lines.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section II provides a short literature review, 
highlighting empirical studies that informed our choice of explanatory variables. Section III 
describes the CIR database and our sample of credit line usage observations. We present 
some descriptive statistics and analysis that highlight the importance of firm default on these 
usage rates. We also discuss the properties of the smaller sample based on merging the CIR 
database with the Informa database of borrowers’ balance sheet variables. Section IV 
presents our regression models and our empirical results, and Section V concludes.   6
II. Literature review 
 
The extant academic literature related to corporate credit lines examines a variety of 
issues, ranging from credit line origination, which measures loan supply, to utilization, which 
measures loan demand.
i Melnik and Plaut (1986) found for a surveyed group of U.S. 
corporations that credit line commitment size was an increasing function of maturity, fees, 
collateral, firm size, firm liquidity and risk premium. Ham and Melnik (1987) found for a 
sample of 90 U.S. nonfinancial firms that credit line size was related positively to total sales, 
borrowed reserves and collateral, while related negatively to interest rate costs. Berger and 
Udell (1995) found for a sample of small U.S. firms that credit line terms, such as interest 
rates and collateral requirements, are negatively related with the length of the banking 
relationship. Shockley and Thakor (1997) examined credit line pricing using data for one 
large bank. Dennis et al. (2000) examined jointly several credit line terms, such as maturity, 
interest rate spread, fees and collateralization, at origination and found an important degree of 
interdependence between these variables. 
 
A few papers have used corporate credit lines to analyze the role of banks within the 
financial system. Morgan (1998) uses credit line data from bank surveys collected from the 
mid-1970s through the mid-1980s to examine the monetary transmission mechanism in the 
U.S. He shows that loans based on existing credit lines accelerate or remain unchanged after 
a policy tightening, but that origination of new term loans slows. This distinction reflects a 
decrease in loan supply and not loan demand. Saidenberg and Strahan (1999) find that firms 
drew upon their bank lines when access to the commercial paper market was limited in 1998.  
Gatev and Strahan (2005) further examine banks’ role in providing liquidity to the financial 
system using data on credit lines established to support commercial paper issuance. They find 
that banks are able to supply credit via these lines when liquidity is low because banks are the 
natural recipients of funds when this occurs. 
 
Our paper focuses directly on the determinants of corporate credit line use, as in Sufi 
(2007) and Agarwal et al. (2004).  Sufi (2007) takes a corporate finance angle looking at the 
role of credit lines as an alternative liquidity management tool. Using a sample of public U.S. 
firms from 1996 to 2003, he finds that credit line access and use was influenced by firm 
profitability, industry, age and size. He finds the supply of credit lines to be particularly 
sensitive to firm profitability; a one standard deviation move EBITDA raises line   7
commitments by 20% to 25%. He finds that technical defaults (i.e., the violation of line 
covenants) the year before lead to increased restrictions on the undrawn portions of credit 
lines, although the reduction seems to be temporary.  The amount available from the credit 
line appears to return to its prior level two years after the violation. Agarwal et al. (2004) 
examine a proprietary dataset of loan commitments extended by a single bank to 712 
privately-held U.S. firms. They find that firms with higher growth commit to larger lines of 
credit and have a higher rate of line utilization. Furthermore, firms facing higher rates and 
fees as well as firms facing more uncertainty in their funding needs commit to smaller credit 
lines. 
 
  As mentioned in the introduction, the Spanish CIR data allows us to examine a larger 
set of credit lines across a wide cross-section of firms and a longer time period than these 
prior studies. In addition, the structure of the CIR database allows us to examine a wider 
variety of line-specific, firm-specific and borrower-specific factors, as well as general 
macroeconomic factors, influencing corporate credit line usage. As in Sufi (2007), we 
examine how defaulting on a credit line (or any related credit) affects credit line usage. In 
addition, we examine several other line-specific variables, such as the line’s lifespan (i.e., the 
number of years active) as well as the use of collateral (see Boot and Thakor, 1994, for a 
theoretical discussion and Jiménez et al., 2006, for empirical evidence).  
 
  Regarding firm-specific variables, the CIR database only permits a limited study due 
to a dearth of accounting variables; in contrast, banking relationship variables, such as prior 
default status and the nature of firms’ banking relationships, as per Petersen and Rajan 
(1994), are available. However, we merge the CIR database with the Informa database of 
Spanish firms, which includes a much richer set of accounting variables. This combined 
dataset is smaller, but it allows the analysis of such key variables as borrower size, age, 
leverage and profitability. 
 
  For lender-specific variables, the CIR database allows us to examine several features. 
For example, Coleman et al. (2002) found that lender characteristics impact loan contract 
terms. Specifically, they found that riskier banks and banks with greater bargaining power 
lend for longer maturities and charge higher spreads; see also Hao (2004). For our study, we 
examine the impact that measures of bank risk and main bank status have on corporate credit 
line use. In addition, Salas and Saurina (2002) found that the type of lending institution has   8
an important effect on corporate lending within the Spanish banking system. 
 
 
III. Database and descriptive statistics 
  
III.A. The CIR database 
 
Our datasource is the credit register maintained by the Banco de España, the Spanish 
central bank and primary banking supervisory agency.  Known as the Central de Información 
de Riesgos (CIR), the dataset contains information on any loan commitment above €6,000 
granted by any bank operating in Spain. The database is essentially a census of all corporate 
bank lending within Spain from 1984 to 2005, a period that includes the deep recession of 
1992 to 1994 and two expansionary periods from the late 1980s through early 1990s and 
from 1997 onwards. The database is updated at a monthly frequency, but our analysis is 
conducted at an annual frequency using data as of the last month of each sample year. 
 
The CIR database contains detailed information about loan characteristics such as 
instrument type (i.e., commercial loan, lease financing, etc.), currency, maturity, 
collateralization, default status as well as the amount drawn and the total commitment 
available for credit lines.
ii The definition of default within the CIR database is that the 
borrower has loan payments overdue by more than 90 days, which is the legal definition of 
default in Spain, or it has been classified as a doubtful borrower by the bank (i.e., the lender 
itself believes there is a high probability of non-payment).  Here we differ from Sufi (2007) 
for whom default means a breach of the existing covenants on the credit line. In addition, 
information on the borrower’s industry and province of headquarters are available.  
 
Given the nature of the CIR database, we can also obtain information on the bank-
borrower relationship via simple data transformations; for example, the length of a banking 
relationship, the number of loans outstanding, and the percentage of a firm’s credit line 
commitments provided by a specific bank (i.e., we can determine whether a bank is a firm’s 
sole bank lender or holds just a small share of its bank debt).  
 
To construct our dataset, we first identify new bank credit lines to non-financial firms 
in the CIR database. Despite the fact that most credit lines have a maturity of a year or less, it   9
is quite common to find them again the following year with exactly the same characteristics 
(in particular, the commitment size), changing only the amount drawn. For those cases, 
following Moral (2006), we assume it is the same credit line, although we classify the 
observations as having a short maturity. Then, we track those lines through time using all 
their available characteristics (i.e., borrower, total amount, collateral, etc.).  
 
If we find that the commitment amount for a firm’s credit line has increased, we treat 
this as a new credit line in our dataset. However, if the commitment amount declines, we 
assume that it is the same credit line. The rationale behind this choice is that an increase in 
commitment amount reflects a renewed lending relationship, whereas a reduction is simply a 
risk management technique available to the bank under the existing relationship. Empirical 
support for this filtering choice is provided by Sufi (2007), who found that credit line 
commitments were reduced immediately after a technical default only to be returned to their 
previous levels the year after.   
 
After applying our filtering procedures, we have a sample of 2,078,434 credit line-
year observations corresponding to 770,371 credit lines granted to 368,977 firms by 407 
banks over a twenty year period. This dataset is a clear improvement over previous studies 
since it is not limited to a single bank, a specific set of firms, or a narrow time period.  
Roughly 55% of the observations correspond to credit lines held by a firm with a single bank, 
20% correspond to firms that hold two banking relationships, 10% with three banks, and the 
remaining 15% with more than three.  In terms of defaults, 1.80% of the firms in our sample 
default on 0.59% of their credit lines, which make up 0.22% of our credit-line year 
observations. 
 
For our analysis, we compute the credit line usage rate as the ratio between the drawn 
amount at each time and the total commitment size of the line at the time it was granted.  In 








RDRAWN =               (1) 
 
where DRAWNijkt is the amount drawn on the credit line at the end of year t and COMMITijkτ   10
is the original commitment provided in year τ (i.e., the year of the line’s origination). The 
histogram of RDRAWNijkt for the whole sample is presented in Figure 1. Just over 15% of all 
credit line-year observations are zero, corresponding to 306,274 unique credit lines. 
Conversely, almost 6% of these observations are at 100% usage. For the remaining 79% of 
the observations, the distribution is relatively symmetrical around the 50% value.  
 
  III. B. Univariate event study 
 
Figure 2 presents one of our most important empirical results. Since the CIR database 
has information on when firms default on their credit lines, we can transform our credit line 
usage data from calendar time to event time, where the default year is designated as time 
zero.  For each of the 17 years for which we have event-time data (i.e., 21 sample years - 5 
years of prior event time), RDRAWNijkt for defaulted credit lines are placed into event time 
with that year as time zero. These ratios are then tracked for five years prior to (i.e., back to 
event time -5). The figure presents the median values of the usage rates for defaulted credit 
lines. We also plot the median value for non-defaulting firms, which is 47%, for reference.  
Table I presents the underlying numbers. 
 
Firms that default on a credit line draw down more than firms that do not default up to 
three years before the default year. At that point, the median usage rate for defaulting firms is 
at 58%. By the default year, the median RDRAWNijkt ratio for defaulting firms reaches its 
maximum of about 70%. This univariate analysis shows that the default status of a firm on a 
credit line is a major driver of its credit line usage. Our subsequent regression analysis, 
presented in Section IV, confirms that this factor remains the most important one, even after 
controlling for line-specific, firm-specific and lender-specific factors as well as for general 
macroeconomic conditions.  This empirical result also highlights the importance of modeling 
credit line usage within a risk management context and, in particular, the need to pay 
attention to the interaction between PD and EAD (see Jiménez et al.(2007) for a detailed 
analysis of EAD measures using the CIR database). 
 
III.C. Subsample based on merging with firm balance sheet data 
 
As mentioned, the CIR database does not contain firm-level accounting data, which 
several other studies have used to investigate corporate credit lines. To address this   11
shortcoming, we merge our credit line dataset with the annual balance sheet reports collected 
by the Spanish government’s Commercial Register and made available electronically by 
Informa from 1992, the Spanish subsidiary of Bureau van Dyck. The Informa dataset should 
contain the financial statements that the banks had at the time the credit lines were granted 
and allow us to use a richer set of firm-specific variables in our analysis.  
 
After this merging of datasets, the Informa subsample contains 425,939 credit line 
observations corresponding to 183,723 credit lines to 85,949 firms by 301 banks. The merged 
sample of credit lines is different from the full sample in several important ways. First, the 
sample period of Informa data is shorter and only spans from 1992 to 2004 with lower 
coverage in the first two years. Second, the size distribution of the firms within this sample is 
larger; that is, typically larger firms are recorded in the Informa database relative to all the 
CIR firms. Third, the default rates are lower in the merged dataset, being only 0.1% of credit 
line observations for the merged sample relative to 0.4% for the whole sample in the same 
range of years. However, the histogram and event study corresponding to the Informa 
subsample are similar to those of the full sample. 
 
 
IV.   Econometric modeling 
 
 IV.A.  Baseline  model 
 
The baseline model we propose for analyzing the determinants of credit line usage is:  
 
it ijk t kt jt it ijkt ε η Cycle Economic β Bank β Firm β Line Credit β β RDRAWN + + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0 , (2) 
 
where Credit Lineit is a vector of credit line characteristics, both time-varying and constant; 
jt Firm is a vector of firm-specific characteristics;  kt Bank  is a vector of variables that control 
for bank characteristics; Economic Cyclet is a measure of expected macroeconomic 
conditions in t+1;  ijk η  is an unobservable credit line effect that is fixed over time and thus 
also encompasses unobservable firm and bank effects; and  it ε  is an error term.  Note that we 
cluster the standard errors in our calculations on the basis of the firms in the sample. 
   12
  We structure the Credit Lineit  vector of explanatory variables to reflect relevant 




1i t 1 1 1 2 i t 1 3 i t i
14 15 i it
16 i 16 i
Credit Line     ( # years from default # years from default ) Defaulted
( Defaulted ) Line age
Long term Collateralized .
β= β + β + β ⋅
+β + β ⋅
+β +β
   (3) 
 
With this specification, we highlight the impact of the credit line’s default status over the 
sample period and its age effects.  The “default effect” captured in the first term measures 
both the impact of credit line default through the Defaulted indicator variable, which equals 
one for credit lines that are defaulted on during our sample period, and through its prior-to-
default effect.
iii We set this latter variable equal to the actual number of years prior to default 
for defaulting credit lines, such that it is an ordinal variable less or equal than zero (i.e. it 
takes the values -11, -10, …, 0). We also introduce a quadratic effect to allow for a greater 
flexibility of response. As mentioned before, the proportion of observations corresponding to 
defaulted credit lines is only 0.57%. From the descriptive analysis presented earlier, we 
expect a positive sign for the β12 coefficient since usage rates rise as the default year 
approaches. Moreover, if credit lines to riskier borrowers have higher usage rates, we expect 
a positive 11 β coefficient, which would capture the difference in levels of usage rates between 
defaulted and non-defaulted credit lines. 
  
We also model the “age effect” of the credit line; that is, we examine how credit line 
utilization evolves over the life of the contract. We capture this effect in the second term with 
the Line ageit variable, which is simply a linear trend. We also permit a different slope for 
defaulted credit lines by using an interaction term with the Defaultedi indicator. The effect of 
Line ageit on the usage rate is unknown. A positive coefficient would indicate that firms 
increase line use as the credit line ages. However, a negative value would suggest that credit 
lines are used more intensively during the first year and decline afterwards. If this is the case, 
we expect a smaller effect for defaulted credit lines, since their usage rates are higher. Thus, 
if  14 β is estimated to be negative, the estimated  15 β is expected to be positive, such that 
0 15 14 < + β β . 
   13
  We also introduce two time-invariant, credit line characteristics.  The  i term   Long  
variable is equal to one if the reported maturity of the credit line is greater than one year. 
While these cases account for only 24% of the observations, longer maturities could be 
indicative of differences in drawdown patterns. The  Collaterlizedi variable is equal to one if 
the credit line is collateralized, which was found to be significant in Jiménez and Saurina 
(2004) as well as Jiménez et al. (2006).  Eleven percent of the observations correspond to 
collateralized lines. 
 
Turning to the firm-specific variables based on the CIR database, our baseline model 
specifies the firm-specific variable as: 
 
2 jt 21 jt-1 22 jt-1
23 jt-1
24 jt-1
Firm   Ln(Total commitments ) Firm risk
Ln(1 # years with the bank )
Ln(# bank relationships ).
β= β + β
+β +
+β
.    (4) 
 
Note that these variables are lagged to better capture the firms’ decision process regarding its 
credit line usage, following Sufi (2007) and Jiménez et al. (2006). The 
) s commitment   Ln(Total 1 - jt variable is the only proxy for firm size available within the CIR 
database and is constructed as the logged sum of all of a firm’s debt commitments. The 
expected sign on β21 is ambiguous; that is, larger firms could be more creditworthy and 
capable of handling a higher debt load( ) 21 i.e., 0 β > , but they may also have access to lower 
cost funding sources () 21 i.e., 0 β< . 
 
A firm’s degree of solvency or financial risk is a key element of its overall funding 
decisions and its credit line use.  However, the only CIR variable that may be used as a proxy 
for firm risk is a binary default variable equal to one if the firm had defaulted on any other 
loan prior to time t. Note that just 2% of the observations correspond to such firms. Since this 
1 - jt risk   Firm  proxy is available to all its lenders, we should expect closer monitoring of firms 
with prior defaults, which could result in their having lower credit line usage rates 
( 22 i.e., 0 β<).
iv  In addition, the credit line effect  ijk η  should also capture firm-level fixed 
effects related to firm risk. 
   14
The last two firm-specific variables are related to the nature of corporate banking 
relationships, which are proxies for the firm’s bargaining power and solvency.   
The jt-1 Ln(1 # years with the bank ) +  variable measures the length of the relationship with the 
bank underwriting the credit line, which has been used to examine the possibility of the so-
called “hold-up” problem faced by borrowers with their main banks. In contrast, the 
jt-1 Ln(# bank relationships )variable acts in the opposite direction since multiple bank 
relationships suggest greater bargaining power by the borrower and hence probably less 
information exchange with individual lenders. To measure appropriately the impact of these 
two variables is necessary to control by the age of the firm. Although this information is not 
available is the CIR it can be obtained from the Spanish Commercial Register.  
 
In a related sense, several studies have shown that bank characteristics impact loan 
access and pricing, and we examine here whether these variables impact credit line usage.  
The third term of our baseline model is constructed as
v:  
 
3 kt 31 ijk 32 kt 33 kt
34 k 35 k
Bank      Main bank  Bank share  Bank NPL ratio
Savings  bank Credit cooperative .
β= β + β + β
+β +β
   (5) 
 
The  ijk Main bank variable equals one if the credit line is handled by the firm’s largest lender; 
just over 41% of the observations fall into this category. Sharpe (1990) argues that the 
monitoring process provides the main lending bank better information on borrower credit 
quality and gives it the monopoly of this information, which could lead to a “hold-up” 
situation. If this is the case, the main bank could constrain the liquidity of the firm since it is 
tied, suggesting the β31 coefficient should be negative. Alternatively to the “hold-up” theory 
we know from different empirical and theoretical papers (see, for instance, Farinha and 
Santos, 2002) that firms with past poor performance and those that more often had loans that 
were past due are more likely to initiate multiple relationships. The reason is the main bank’s 
unwillingness to provide more funds to the firm due to its poor past history and the incentives 
of banks to share risks of lower credit quality firms. This would imply a positive coefficient 
on the number of banking relationships (β24>0) and a negative one on the main bank variable 
(β31<0) if less creditworthy firms decide to enter into new relationships keeping their main 
bank unchanged. Thus, loans with the main bank will collect those more screened, and hence, 
less used credit lines of high-risk firms and those loans of low-risk firms.    15
 
The  Bank sharekt variable is constructed as a bank’s share of the corporate loan 
market and is a proxy for bank size.  The Bank NPL ratiokt variable, constructed as the ratio 
of a bank’s nonperforming loans within the CIR database to its total loans minus the average 
bank NPL in that year, is a proxy for bank riskiness.  The signs on the coefficients for these 
two variables are unclear a priori, and we view them more as control variables. We also 
include as control variables the type of the bank, which was shown by Salas and Saurina 
(2002) to be important within the Spanish economy. Our sample consists of corporate credit 
lines originated by commercial banks, savings banks and credit cooperatives, which account 
for 99% of lending in the economy. 
 
Finally, general macroeconomic conditions should play an important role in credit line 
usage from a theoretical point of view. The literature on the lending channel of monetary 
policy transmission has established that firms are more constrained in their access to external 
financing during recessions and hence more likely to draw on their credit lines (see 
Saidenberg and Strahan, 1999, for analysis of a recent such episode). This outcome would 
imply that firms will use their existing credit lines more in anticipation of economic 
downturns. As we do not have firm-level data on sales and orders, we use as a proxy real, 
annual Spanish GDP growth in aggregate from period t+1 as our measure of expected 
conditions.  Our specification is 
 
4t 4 1 t 1 Economic cycle GDPG . + β= β       (6) 
 
We would expect a positive GDP growth rate to lead to a decline in credit line use and thus 
β41 to be negative.  However, we would expect a negative GDP growth rate to increase credit 
line use, suggesting that β42 is positive and that β41+β42 is positive. 
 
Table II presents the summary statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables 
for the full sample from 1986 to 2005. The distribution of the utilization ratio RDRAWNijkt for 
is symmetric with mean and median values of 47.5% and 50.0% respectively. As mentioned, 
the proportion of observations corresponding to defaulted credit lines is only 0.57%. The 
year-to-default variable ranges from -11 to 0, but has average and median values of -1.  The 
average line age for our sample is 1.2 years. With respect to firm characteristics, the total   16
commitment amount shows a high degree of dispersion with an interquartile size of between 
€115,000 and €1.6 million with a median value of €408,000. The average length of the bank 
relationship is 4 years, while firms have, on average, 2.8 lenders. Note that these latter two 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles and at the 99% percentile, 
respectively, to reduce estimation bias due to outliers.  
 
Regarding bank level variables, 41% of the credit line usage observations are linked to 
banks that are the main lender for the firm. The average loan market share of each bank is 
relatively low at 0.03%, although the maximum is 14.7%. The deviation of the non-
performing loan ratio with respect to the yearly average has a zero mean, with considerable 
dispersion. As determined by Salas and Saurina (2002), it is important to mention of the types 
of Spanish banks. Both commercial and savings banks play a significant role in credit and 
deposit markets, holding similar shares of each market. Yet, their organizational structures 
are quite different. Commercial banks are for-profit firms under shareholder control, while 
savings banks (or cajas de ahorros) are effectively commercial entities operated by not-for-
profit organizations controlled by depositors, employees and other public and private groups. 
These two bank types exhibit important differences in non-performing loan ratios, a result 
that might be relevant for their underwriting of credit lines. For our sample, commercial and 
savings banks have a 47% and 48% share, respectively, of the credit line-year observations, 
while credit cooperatives make up the remaining 5% of the observations. At the beginning of 
the sample period in 1986, commercial banks dominated the market with a market share of 
80%. The progressive entrance of savings banks into corporate lending, mainly after the 
regulatory changes introduced in the late 1980s, caused a steady decline in the market share 
of commercial banks in favor of savings banks.
vi 
 
IV.B. Model  estimation 
  
In this paper, we estimate our model using three econometric techniques. First, we use 
OLS regression with random effects, which assumes strict exogeneity between the 
unobserved, credit line effects (i.e.,  ijk η ) and the explanatory variables. Note that the common 
fixed effects also control for firm and bank effects, but we cannot separate them out. To 
examine the robustness of the OLS results, the second estimation technique we use is a Tobit 
model with a double censure, since the RDRAWNijkt variable is bounded by the unit interval.   17
We motivate our use of the Tobit model by thinking of 
* y  as a firm’s desired level of credit 
line utilization as opposed to the observed value  y . In such cases, OLS techniques could 
generate downward biased coefficients. By taking account of the censoring, the Tobit model 
should avoid these biases and provide a form of robustness analysis.  
 
Our third estimation technique is Within-Groups estimation that treats  ijk η  as a fixed 
effect.  This estimation technique controls for possible correlation of the unobserved fixed 
effects with the regressors; that is, this technique helps account for the possibility that banks 
may have more information about the risk profile of the firm than is captured and observable 
in the CIR dataset. Therefore, our preferred approach is the Within-Groups estimation, as it 
controls for those possible correlations. Thus, a comparison of the OLS and Within-Groups 
estimation techniques allows us to investigate whether any of the OLS parameter estimates 
are biased due to the potential correlation between the unobserved error components and the 
corresponding explanatory variables.  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that given the large number of observations, denoted as N, 
in our sample, the estimated standard errors will be very low since they are proportional to 
1/N. Thus, almost all our explanatory variables will be statistically significant, despite their 
relatively small marginal effects on the dependent variable. For this reason, we show both the 
p-values of the coefficients and the semi-elasticities of the variables. The semi-elasticities 
measure the percentage change in the dependent variable to unit increases in the explanatory 
variables expressed in levels or 100% increases in the explanatory variables expressed in 
logged form, while the other explanatory variables are kept at their means. 
 
IV.C. Empirical  results 
 
           Table III presents the estimation results for our baseline model. The first set of results 
is based on a OLS regression with random effects. The coefficient on the default indicator 
variable is positive and significant with a semi-elasticity of 38%, which implies that defaulted 
credit lines have an usage rate 38% higher than non-defaulted ones. Since the average usage 
rates for the defaulted and non-defaulted firms in the sample are 63 percentage points and 47 
percentage points, the model’s 38% increase (47 percentage points * 1.38 = 65 percentage 
points) seems reasonable. The two interacted years-to-default variables show a positive and   18
very significant relationship, suggesting an increasing use of credit lines as a firm’s time to 
default approaches. The semi-elasticity of these two terms is about 14%, which means that 
one year closer to default raises the usage rate 14% relative to the average usage rate.   
 
We also find that our line age variable is quite important.  The age effect is captured 
through a trend, which has a negative and significant coefficient, and implies that the usage 
rate decreases almost 10% per year with respect to the average usage rate. The effect is 
weaker for defaulted credit lines at a 7.7% decrease (=-9.7% + 2.0%).  The countervailing 
positive default effect and negative age effect suggest an interesting U-shaped pattern in 
credit line, as illustrated in Figure 3.  Using the average values for all the other explanatory 
variables, Figure 3 shows the impact of the age effect for non-defaulting firms and the joint 
impact for defaulting firms. Starting at 7 years prior to default and with a new line, usage 
rates are at 52.9% and 56.3%, respectively. As we approach default, the age effect linearly 
lowers the usage rate for non-defaulting firms to 20.4% by the default year. For defaulting 
firms, this linear decline is more gradual and is outweighed by the default effect starting at 
four years prior to default.  
 
While these two effects are the main drivers of credit line usage, the line-specific 
maturity indicator has an important impact, where higher maturity lines have a usage rate that 
is 5.4% higher than one-year lines. This result suggests that firms treat longer-term credit 
lines as a more stable funding source and hence use them more. Interestingly, collateralized 
credit lines are found to have slightly lower usage rates than uncollateralized lines. Since 
collateral is an ex-ante proxy of credit risk, as found by Jiménez and Saurina (2004), the 
negative β16 coefficient is in line with the assumption that banks restrict credit line use by less 
creditworthy firms.  
 
Turning to the firm-specific effects in the CIR dataset, firm size, measured as the total 
commitment amount of firm lines, does not have a material impact on the usage rate, most 
probably due to the limited effectiveness of this size proxy. The  jt-1 Firm risk measure based 
on prior defaults is negatively correlated with credit line use, suggesting that lower-quality 
borrowers use their lines more carefully or are closely monitored by their lenders. Finally, the 
length of the banking relationship is negatively related with usage, suggesting that older firms 
do not draw down as much, which also might be the result of hold-up problem. The OLS   19
results also suggest that firms have higher usage rates with their main banks and once they 
establish more banking relationships. 
 
In terms of the lender characteristics, if the lender is the firm’s main bank, line usage 
increased by just over 7%, implying that borrowers may be dependent of their main banking 
relationship for financing. Bank size, defined as the total share of lending within our CIR data 
sample, has a negative correlation with credit line usage, decreasing the usage rate by 8.3% 
when the banks’ share increases by a percentage point. Credit lines granted by savings banks 
and cooperatives have lower usage rates at 8.5% and 3.8%, respectively, than commercial 
banks. This result may be due to savings banks’ entrance to the corporate market through 
lending to high-quality firms, or perhaps to their more conservative policies than commercial 
banks, as per Salas and Saurina (2002).  Note, however, that credit lines granted by high-risk 
banks (i.e., higher NPL with respect to the yearly average) do not show a different pattern. 
 
Our results also imply a significant relationship between macroeconomic conditions 
and credit line use. As suggested in the theoretical literature, such as Thakor (2005), firms use 
their credit lines to secure liquidity during worsening economic conditions, but instead rely 
more on their own cash flows or other cheaper sources of liquidity during periods of 
improved conditions. Unfortunately, we do not have further information, such as on the 
interest rates paid on these credit lines, to examine whether credit lines are used as a liquidity 
insurance mechanism with a corresponding premium over other funding sources. We also test 
for possible asymmetries in response to positive and negative GDP growth rates
vii and found 
that positive GDP growth leads to a reduction in credit line use by about 1%, whereas 
negative GDP growth leads to nearly 3% increase in credit line use. 
 
The second column of Table III presents the baseline model’s parameter estimates 
using the Tobit model with random effects. Overall, the results are in line with the OLS 
estimation results. Notably, the default and age effects are more pronounced here, leading to 
a stronger U-shaped pattern in their combination (Figure 4).  
 
The test statistics for first- and second-order autocorrelation in the residuals of OLS 
estimation indicate a significant autocorrelation, consistent with the presence of credit line 
fixed effects that could bias the estimated coefficients. Furthermore, the autocorrelation 
coefficients for the residuals show a slow decline from 0.65, corresponding to the first-order   20
autocorrelation, to 0.42, corresponding to the fifth. This pattern also supports the existence of 
persistent differences among credit lines that remain in the data over at least a 5-year period. 
To take account of these characteristics, we use panel data techniques to estimate the baseline 
model; i.e., we estimate the model using the Within-Groups estimator and considering  ijk η as 
a fixed effect.  The estimation results are presented in the third column of Table III.
viii  
 
  Most of the OLS results remain robust to this change in estimation technique. In 
particular, the line default, line age, prior default and macroecononic effects remain the same. 
That is, the usage ratio increases with the probability of default of the borrower and the 
worsening of the business cycle, while it decreases with the age of the credit line and the 
observed risk of the firm. Yet, certain of the variables seem to exhibit some bias. For 
example, the β21 coefficient on firms’ logged total commitments becomes positive and has a 
larger marginal effect on credit line usage. However, the reasonableness of this variable as a 
proxy for firm size is an open question that we address in the next section.  
 
  Regarding the estimation results related to some of the relationship banking variables, 
the β24 and β31 estimates (corresponding to the number of banking relationships and the main 
bank indicator variable, respectively) change signs. The Within-Group estimates indicate that 
firms with multiple bank relationships exhibit lower levels of credit line use, as they are 
potentially less well known by their lenders. This result is consistent with Farinha and Santos 
(2002), who found that less creditworthy firms and those with bad past performance are more 
likely to establish multiple banking relationships to obtain more funds when their lead banks 
deny their funding requests.  Credit lines granted by the firm’s main bank have a lower level 
of use, due to a possible “hold-up” as per Sharpe (1990).  Our overall conclusion is that the 
Within-Group estimates for these relationship variables are more statistically reliable, but 
further analysis is necessary to understand their economic interpretation. 
 
IV.D.  Analysis of the Informa subsample 
 
As discussed, to complement the scant firm-specific information available in the CIR 
database, we merged it with the Informa database of accounting variables that firms report to 
the Spanish Commercial Register. Table IV presents the summary statistics for this Informa 
subsample.  This data is only available from 1992 to 2004, and since coverage is limited in   21
the first few years that correspond to the Spanish recession, useful observations regarding 
defaulted credit lines are unfortunately lost. We observe that the average number of defaulted 
observations is 0.11%, much lower than the 0.55% in the whole sample, again partly due to 
the loss of observations in the early 1990s. This fact suggests a bias of this sub-sample 
towards higher-quality firms, which must be taken into account when analyzing the results. In 
addition, the firms have longer and more banking relationships in this subsample.  
 
We again use the baseline model described before, but the firm-specific vector of 
variables is redefined as: 






Firm    Ln(Total assets ) Firm risk
Ln(1 # years with the bank )
Ln(# bank relationships ).
ln(1+Age of the firm )
ROA
Equity/Total assets Liquidity 





+β +β jt-1 ratio .
   (7) 
The  ) assets   Ln(Total 1 - jt variable is the logged book value of the firm. Profitability is 
measured here by  1 - jt ROA , which is the ratio of earnings (before interest and taxes) to total 
assets. As proxies for firm solvency and liquidity, we use the  jt-1 Equity/Total assets  and 
jt-1 Liquidity  ratio  variables, defined as the ratio of firm cash to total assets. Since more 
profitable, larger and more liquid firms are likely to have a higher credit quality, we expect a 
negative relationship between all these variables and credit line usage. As before, the 
jt-1 Firm risk  measure of the firm default history, the number of bank relationships, and the 
length of the main bank relationship are included. 
 
  Table V reports the three sets of regression results for the merged dataset.
  The results 
show that the default effect remains the primary factor regarding credit line use.  Defaulting 
credit lines have a usage level just over 40% greater than non-defaulting ones. Interestingly, 
the time-to-default effect is not present in this subsample, most probably due to the presence 
of the firm-level accounting variables that better track defaulting firms’ declining 
performance. As with the full sample, the age effect decreases line use. Non-defaulting credit 
lines decrease at a pace of between 10% and 12% per year, while defaulting credit lines 
decrease between 12% and 15% per year. Regarding other credit line’s characteristics, longer   22
maturities are correlated with greater line use. The results of the lender-specific and general 
economic variables are similar to those for the full sample. 
 
  With regard firm-specific variables, the rough CIR proxy for firm risk and the richer 
proxies available from the merged dataset both provide similar results; that is, increased firm 
risk leads to increased credit line usage. Specifically, the coefficients on the firm size, age, 
ROA, solvency ratio, and liquidity ratio variables are all negative and significant, although 
their economic impact is limited. This empirical evidence is in line with the results obtained 
by Sufi (2007), who finds that profitability and liquidity are the measures banks take into 
account when deciding to grant a corporate credit line. This overall result is in line with the 
assumption that less creditworthy firms (i.e., smaller, younger, less profitable and less solvent 
firms) use their credit lines more intensively than high-quality ones. Furthermore, these 
results suggest that banks’ monitoring of firms within the Spanish banking system seems to 
be based more on prior default indicators than on the near-term financial performance of the 
firm as the coefficient on the default history of the firm is still negative and significant and, 
based on its high economic impact, seems to be one of the main factors driving the behaviour 





In this paper, we examine corporate credit line usage based on the Spanish Credit 
Register, a huge transaction-based database known as the Central de Información de Riesgos 
(CIR), which covers all Spanish banks lending over the last twenty years. The extensive 
nature of the CIR dataset allows us to examine the determinants of corporate credit line usage 
as a function of loan-specific, firm-specific, and lender-specific factors as well as general 
macroeconomic conditions.  
 
One of our main findings is that credit lines are drawn down more by firms that 
eventually default on these lines than firms that do not. This usage rate is higher in a 
statistically significant way from at least three years prior to default and increases 
monotonically as default approaches. As far as we know, this empirical finding is new to the 
literature and has important implications for credit risk modeling and management in that 
exposure at default (EAD) in corporate credit lines cannot be considered independent of firm   23
default probability. Moreover, given the option characteristics of credit lines, our results 
provide stylized facts that any pricing model must account for. 
 
From a multivariate perspective, we find that credit line default is the largest 
explanatory factor for credit line usage, with the age of the line being the second largest 
factor. We find that borrowers identified ex-ante as riskier (i.e., those that defaulted before) 
access their credit lines less, a result that is analogous to the firm profitability result found by 
Sufi (2007). For a subsample of credit lines for which firm-level accounting data is available, 
we find that smaller, younger, less profitable and less solvent firms use their credit lines more 
intensively. However, the economic significance of these variables is muted relative to 
funding supply variables, such as the length and number of a firm’s banking relationships.  
We also find that credit line use has asymmetric cyclical characteristics, with usage declines 
during expansions being a third as large as increases in downturns. Thus, credit lines seem to 
work as a liquidity insurance mechanism for firms, as discussed by Gatev and Strahan (2005) 
and Sufi (2007). However, we do not have information on the interest rate charged on each 
line to examine this finding further. With regard to the impact of borrower-lender relationship 
variables, the results suggest that firms face some hold-up cost when dealing with banks, 
together with the restrictive policies of the main bank to increase it exposure to a firm due to 
its default history. 
 
In summary, our analysis suggests that a wide variety of loan-level, firm-level, lender-
level and macroeconomic factors drive corporate credit line usage. While firm-level 
performance variables are significant in our regressions, their marginal impact is much 
smaller than these other variables. We believe that our results suggest that short of firm 
default, credit line usage by Spanish firms is primarily driven by banking relationships and 
less by firm performance.   24
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The histogram presents the 2,078,434 credit line observations in our full sample. 
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-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
Defaulted credit line. Median Non-defaulted credit line. Median
No. of years from default
Years 
from default # obs. Median Mean
-5 85 50.0 52.1
- 4 2 2 85 0 . 05 0 . 3
- 3 7 1 75 8 . 35 6 . 2
-2 1,939 62.1 60.4
-1 4,512 66.7 64.2
0 4,512 71.1 64.7  28
Table II. 
 















ijkt RDRAWN  is the ratio of the amount drawn at t to the amount available (drawn plus undrawn) when the credit lines was 
granted of a credit line i to firm j by bank k. The variable  i line   credit   Defaulted  takes one if the credit line defaults anytime 
during its life and zero otherwise;  it default   from   years   No.  measures the time to default in years for those credit lines that do 
default during its life; it loan   the   of   Life  measures the number of years since the credit line was grated;  i term   Long  is a 
dummy variable worth 1 if the maturity of the credit lines is longer that 1 year and 0 otherwise  i ized Collateral  is a dummy 
variable worth 1 if the credit line is collateralized and 0 otherwise ; it s commitment   Total  is the sum of all loans and credit 
lines that the firm has; 
i jt risk   Firm  controls for the observed risk of the firm j and takes the value of 1 if the borrower 
defaulted any time until t; ;  1 - jt bank   the    with years   of   No. measures the number of years since the firm got the first loan with 
the bank;   1 - jt ips relationsh   bank   of   No.  is the number of banks with which the firm has loans;  ikt bank   Main  is  a dummy 
variable that takes one if the bank that granted the loan is the main bank for the firm and 0 otherwise;  kt  share Bank  proxies 
the size of the bank through its market share in loans to firms; kt ratio   NPL   Bank  is the non-performing loan ratio of bank k 
at time t with respect to the NPL ratio of the year; k bank    Savings  is a dummy variable worth 1 if the bank is a savings bank, 
0 otherwise;  k e cooperativ   Credit  is a dummy variable worth 1 if the bank is a credit cooperative, 0 otherwise.; and 
1 + t GDPG is the GDP rate of growth of the Spanish economy at t+1. 
No. of observatios: 2,078,434
No.of  credit lines: 770,371
No.of firms: 368,977
Sample period: 1986-2005
Mean S.D. Min Q25 Median Q75 Max
Credit Line Characteristics
  RDRAWNijkt (%)  47.53 32.97 0.00 19.05 50.00 76.11 100.00
  Defaulted credit linei (0/1) 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
  No. years from defaultit (for defaulted credit lines) -1.01 1.09 -11.00 -2.00 -1.00 0.00 0.00
  Life of the loanit 1.17 1.40 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 20.00
  Long termi (0/1) 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
  Collateralizedi (0/1) 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Firm Characteristics
  Total commitmentsjt-1 (thousand of euros) 1,694.86 2,884.92 0.00 115.48 408.20 1,558.40 10,346.99
  Firm riskjt-1 (0/1) 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
  No. of years with the bankjt-1 3.87 3.82 0.00 1.00 3.00 6.00 21.00
  No. of bank relationshipsjt-1 2.82 2.90 0.00 0.00 2.00 4.00 9.00
Bank Characteristics
  Main bankikt (0/1) 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
  Bank sharekt (%) 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 14.72
  Bank NPL ratiokt (%) 0.00 0.81 -11.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.58
  Savings bankk (0/1) 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
  Credit cooperativek (0/1) 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Cycle Characteristics
  GDPGt+1 (%) 3.36 1.22 -1.03 2.76 3.33 3.86 5.55  29
Table III. 
 

































it ijk t kt jt it ijkt ε η Cycle Economic β Bank β Firm β Line Credit β β RDRAWN + + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0 . 
Tobit model: 
 
) 0 ), 100 , ( ( 4 3 1 2 1 0 it ijk t kt jt it ijkt ε η Cycle Economic β Bank β Firm β Line Credit β β Min Max RDRAWN + + + + + + = − . 
The dependant variable is the ratio of the amount drawn at t to the amount available (drawn plus undrawn) when the credit 
lines was granted of a credit line i to firm j by bank k. The variable  i line   credit   Defaulted  takes one if the credit line defaults 
anytime during its life and zero otherwise;  it default   from   years   No.  measures the time to default in years for those credit 
lines that do default during its life; it loan   the   of   Life  measures the number of years since the credit line was grated; 
i term   Long  is a dummy variable worth 1 if the maturity of the credit lines is longer that 1 year and 0 otherwise 
i ized Collateral  is a dummy variable worth 1 if the credit line is collateralized and 0 otherwise ; 1 - jt s commitment   Total  is the 
sum of all loans and credit lines that the firm has;  1 - jt risk   Firm  controls for the observed risk of the firm j and takes the 
value of 1 if the borrower defaulted any time until t;  1 - jt bank   the    with years   of   No. measures the number of years since the 
firm got the first loan with the bank;   1 - jt ips relationsh   bank   of   No.  is the number of banks with which the firm has loans;; 
ikt bank   Main  is  a dummy variable that takes one if the bank that granted the loan is the main bank for the firm and 0 
otherwise;  kt  share Bank  proxies the size of the bank through its market share in loans to firms; kt ratio   NPL   Bank  is the non-
performing loan ratio of bank k at time t with respect to the NPL ratio of the year; k bank    Savings  is a dummy variable worth 
1 if the bank is a savings bank, 0 otherwise;  k e cooperativ   Credit  is a dummy variable worth 1 if the bank is a credit 
cooperative, 0 otherwise;  1 + t GDPG is the GDP rate of growth of the Spanish economy at t+1.  ijk η  is an unobservable credit 
line effect fixed over time; and  it ε  is an error term. T-ratios are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Test for 
serial correlation are based on estimates of the residuals in first differences except where the model has been estimated in 
levels. ***, **, *: statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The Semi-elasticity is computed as the 
marginal effect divided by the sample mean of the usage rate. 
Estimation Method
No. of observatios: 2,078,434












    Default effect
  Defaulted credit linei (0/1) 18.061 *** 38.0 23.693 *** 40.7 -- --
  No. years from defaultit  6.705 *** 10.365 *** 6.166 ***
  No. years from default
2
it  0.661 *** 1.071 *** 0.288 **
    Age effect
  Life of the loanit -4.631 *** -9.7 -6.052 *** -10.4 -4.678 *** -9.8
  Life of the loanit*Defaulted credit linei 0.961 * 2.0 3.425 *** 5.9 -- --
    Other effects
  Long termi (0/1) 2.585 *** 5.4 2.906 *** 5.0 -- --
  Collateralizedi (0/1) -0.529 *** -1.1 0.243 ** 0.4 -- --
Firm Characteristics
  Ln(Total commitmentsjt-1) -0.041 ** -0.1 0.369 *** 0.6 1.238 *** 2.6
  Firm riskjt-1 -3.708 *** -7.8 -4.599 *** -7.9 -5.551 *** -11.7
  Ln(1+# years with the bankjt-1) -3.691 *** -7.8 -3.974 *** -6.8 -1.125 *** -2.4
  Ln(# bank relationshipsjt-1) 3.089 *** 6.5 2.355 *** 4.0 -0.694 *** -1.5
Bank Characteristics
  Main bankikt 3.363 *** 7.1 2.522 *** 4.3 -2.063 *** -4.3
  Bank sharekt -3.945 *** -8.3 -4.233 *** -7.3 -0.654   -1.4
  Bank NPL ratiokt 0.018   0.0 0.027   0.0 0.025   0.1
  Savings bankk (0/1) -4.047 *** -8.5 -4.450 *** -7.7 -- --
  Credit cooperativek (0/1) -1.824 *** -3.8 -1.751 *** -3.0 -- --
Cycle Characteristics
  GDPGt+1 -0.937 *** -2.0 -0.992 *** -1.7 -0.569 *** -1.2
  Constant 57.909 *** -- 57.077 *** -- 50.615 *** --
Credit Line/Firm/Bank fixed effect (ηijk) No No Yes
F-test   (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00
1
rst order serial correlatoin 0.65 0.65 -0.43
2
nd order serial correlatoin 0.58 0.59 0.06
17.8
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ijkt RDRAWN  is the ratio of the amount drawn at t to the amount available (drawn plus undrawn) when the credit lines was 
granted of a credit line i to firm j by bank k. The variable  i line   credit   Defaulted  takes one if the credit line defaults anytime 
during its life and zero otherwise;  it default   from   years   No.  measures the time to default in years for those credit lines that do 
default during its life; it loan   the   of   Life  measures the number of years since the credit line was grated;  i term   Long  is a 
dummy variable worth 1 if the maturity of the credit lines is longer that 1 year and 0 otherwise  i ized Collateral  is a dummy 
variable worth 1 if the credit line is collateralized and 0 otherwise;  ) assets   Ln(Total 1 - jt  proxies for the size of the firm; 
1 - jt m geofthefir A is the number of years since the firm was set up; profitability is measured by  1 - jt ROA , the ratio between 
EBIT and total assets;  1 - jt assets   al Equity/Tot  measures the solvency of the firm;  1 - jt ratio Liquidity  , is the quotient between 
cash and total assets of the firm;  1 - jt risk   Firm  controls for the observed risk of the firm j and takes the value of 1 if the 
borrower defaulted any time until t;  1 - jt bank   the    with years   of   No. measures the number of years since the firm got the first 
loan with the bank;   1 - jt ips relationsh   bank   of   No.  is the number of banks with which the firm has loans;  ikt bank   Main  is  a 
dummy variable that takes one if the bank that granted the loan is the main bank for the firm and 0 otherwise;  kt  share Bank  
proxies the size of the bank through its market share in loans to firms; kt ratio   NPL   Bank  is the non-performing loan ratio of 
bank k at time t with respect to the NPL ratio of the year; k bank    Savings  is a dummy variable worth 1 if the bank is a 
savings bank, 0 otherwise;  k e cooperativ   Credit  is a dummy variable worth 1 if the bank is a credit cooperative, 0 otherwise; 
and  1 + t GDPG is the GDP rate of growth of the Spanish economy at t+1. 
No. of observatios: 425,939
No.of  credit lines: 183,723
No.of firms: 85,949
Sample period: 1993-2004
Mean S.D. Min Q25 Median Q75 Max
Credit Line Characteristics
  RDRAWNijkt (%)  44.91 33.34 0.00 13.33 44.44 74.49 100.00
  Defaulted credit linei (0/1) 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
  No. years from defaultit (for defaulted credit lines) -0.91 0.90 -6.00 -1.00 -1.00 0.00 0.00
  Life of the loanit 1.36 1.56 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 18.00
  Long termi (0/1) 0.22 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
  Collateralizedi (0/1) 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Firm Characteristics
  Total assetsjt-1 (thousand of euros) 2,723.78 2,851.08 43.68 498.15 1,345.20 4,446.00 7,900.09
  Age of the firmjt-1 3.48 7.47 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 26.00
  ROAjt-1 (%) 7.23 7.95 -37.68 3.08 6.10 10.31 60.55
  Equity/Total assetsit-1 (%) 27.03 19.12 0.01 12.14 23.09 37.95 100.00
  Liquidity ratiojt-1 (%) 6.09 9.48 0.00 0.54 2.59 7.51 100.00
  Firm riskjt-1 (0/1) 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
  No. of years with the bankjt-1 5.09 4.29 0.00 2.00 4.00 7.00 21.00
  No. of bank relationshipsjt-1 3.48 2.93 0.00 1.00 3.00 5.00 9.00
Bank Characteristics
  Main bankikt (0/1) 0.39 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
  Bank sharekt (%) 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.09 14.72
  Bank NPL ratiokt (%) 0.00 0.57 -9.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 98.70
  Savings bankk (0/1) 0.52 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
  Credit cooperativek (0/1) 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Cycle Characteristics
  GDPGt+1 (%) 3.53 0.72 2.38 3.00 3.43 3.86 5.04  33
Table V. 
 


































The dependant variable ( ijkt RDRAWN ) is the ratio of the amount drawn at t to the amount available (drawn plus undrawn) 
when the credit lines was granted of a credit line i to firm j by bank k. The variable  i line   credit   Defaulted  takes one if the 
credit line defaults anytime during its life and zero otherwise;  it default   from   years   No.  measures the time to default in years 
for those credit lines that do default during its life; it loan   the   of   Life  measures the number of years since the credit line was 
grated;  i term   Long  is a dummy variable worth 1 if the maturity of the credit lines is longer that 1 year and 0 otherwise 
i ized Collateral  is a dummy variable worth 1 if the credit line is collateralized and 0 otherwise;  ) assets   Ln(Total -1 jt  proxies 
for the size of the firm;  1 - jt m geofthefir A is the number of years since the firm was set up; profitability is measured by 
1 - jt ROA , the ratio between EBIT and total assets;  -1 jt assets   al Equity/Tot  measures the solvency of the firm; 
-1 jt ratio Liquidity  , is the quotient between cash and total assets of the firm;  1 - jt risk   Firm  controls for the observed risk of 
the firm j and takes the value of 1 if the borrower defaulted any time until t;  1 - jt bank   the    with years   of   No. measures the 
number of years since the firm got the first loan with the bank;   1 - jt ips relationsh   bank   of   No.  is the number of banks with 
which the firm has loans;  ikt bank   Main  is  a dummy variable that takes one if the bank that granted the loan is the main bank 
for the firm and 0 otherwise;  kt  share Bank  proxies the size of the bank through its market share in loans to 
firms; kt ratio   NPL   Bank  is the non-performing loan ratio of bank k at time t with respect to the NPL ratio of the 
year; k bank    Savings  is a dummy variable worth 1 if the bank is a savings bank, 0 otherwise;  k e cooperativ   Credit  is a 
dummy variable worth 1 if the bank is a credit cooperative, 0 otherwise; and  1 + t GDPG is the GDP rate of growth of the 
Spanish economy at t+1;  ijk η  is an unobservable credit line effect fixed over time; and  it ε  is an error term. T-ratios are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Test for serial correlation are based on estimates of the residuals in first 
differences except where the model has been estimated in levels. ***, **, *: statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. The Semi-elasticity is computed as the marginal effect divided by the sample mean of the usage rate. 
 
Estimation Method
No. of observatios: 425,939












    Default effect
  Defaulted credit linei (0/1) 18.275 *** 40.7 23.493 *** 42.4 -- --
  # years from defaultit  4.973   9.595 ** 0.556  
  No. years from default
2
it  0.583   1.311 0.610  
    Ageeffect
  Life of the loanit -4.524 *** -10.1 -6.437 *** -11.6 -4.705 *** -10.5
  Life of the loanit*Defaulted credit linei -2.387   -5.3 -0.200   -0.4 -- --
    Other effects
  Long termi (0/1) 3.067 *** 6.8 3.560 *** 6.4 -- --
  Collateralizedi (0/1) 0.031   0.1 2.066 *** 3.7 -- --
Firm Characteristics
  Ln(Total assetsjt-1) -1.225 *** -2.7 -1.372 *** -2.5 -0.826 ** -1.8
  Ln(1+Age of the firmjt-1) -0.475 *** -1.1 -0.444 *** -0.8 -0.556 * -1.2
  ROAjt-1 -0.165 *** -0.4 -0.159 *** -0.3 -0.053 *** -0.1
  Equity/Total assetsjt-1 -0.130 *** -0.3 -0.153 *** -0.3 -0.021 * 0.0
  Liquidity ratiojt-1 -0.229 *** -0.5 -0.213 *** -0.4 0.027 ** 0.1
  Firm riskjt-1 -1.582 *** -3.5 -1.645 *** -3.0 -4.128 *** -9.2
  Ln(1+# years with the bankjt-1) -2.595 *** -5.8 -2.737 *** -4.9 -1.418 *** -3.2
  Ln(No. of bank relationshipsjt-1) 4.645 *** 10.3 4.833 *** 8.7 0.734 ** 1.6
Bank Characteristics
  Main bankikt 2.376 *** 5.3 1.229 *** 2.2 -2.493 *** -5.6
  Bank sharekt -1.291   -2.9 -3.043 *** -5.5 -0.822   -1.8
  Bank NPL ratiokt 0.164 ** 0.4 0.163 * 0.3 0.147   0.3
  Savings bankk (0/1) -3.260 *** -7.3 -3.720 *** -6.7 -- --
  Credit cooperativek (0/1) -1.770 *** -3.9 -1.995 *** -3.6 -- --
Cycle Characteristics
  GDPGt+1 0.352 *** 0.8 0.252 *** 0.5 -0.639 *** -1.4
  Constant 63.132 *** -- 65.351 *** -- 62.730 *** --
Credit Line/Firm/Bank fixed effect (ηijk) No No Yes
F-test   (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00
1
rst order serial correlation 0.60 0.62 -0.43
2
nd order serial correlation 0.52 0.55 0.03
Model 2
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Footnotes 
 
i There is a reasonably large literature on consumer credit lines, such as credit card financing; 
see Gross and Souleles (2002), Calem et al. (2006), and the references therein.  Agarwal et al. 
(2006) examined home equity lines of credit.   
ii Note that the CIR dataset does not contain information on credit line pricing, such as fees 
and interest rates.  For a more detailed explanation of the CIR dataset, see Jiménez and 
Saurina (2004). 
iii Please note that differences in the usage ratios of defaulted credit lines are captured by the 
Defaultedi indicator and/or by the  ijk η fixed effect term.  The #years from defaultit variable 
thus measures the pure impact of firm behavior prior-to-default. 
iv Note that our Firm riskjt-1 variable is similar in spirit to the modeling strategy used by Sufi 
(2007) regarding his technical default indicator. The key difference is that he includes his 
indicator variable in a regression with other measures of firm risk. In fact, his Table 8 shows 
that credit line availability depends crucially on that variable and not on other firm specific 
variables. Hence, a default indicator might possibly be a sufficient statistic for other financial 
characteristics of a firm. 
v Note that these explanatory variables are not lagged since they are exogenous to the firm’s 
drawdown decision and are not expected to change much over time.  
vi The banking liberalization process in Spain and its impact can be seen in Salas and Saurina 
(2003).   
vii This result is available upon request. 
viii The behaviour of the residual’s autocorrelation for OLS estimates plus the possible 
correlation between unobserved fixed effects and some of the explanatory variables explain 
why we favour the Within-Group estimates. 